DENBEAUX & DENBEAUX_NO HEARING_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/22/2011 9:09 AM

No-Hearing Hearings: An Analysis of the Proceedings
of the Combatant Status Review Tribunals at
Guantánamo
*

Mark Denbeaux
**
Joshua Denbeaux
David Gratz
John Gregorek
Matthew Darby
Shana Edwards
Daniel Mann
Megan Sassaman
Helen Skinner

I.

INTRODUCTION

1

After the Supreme Court ruled on June 28, 2004, in Rasul v.
2
3
Bush and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, that the Guantánamo detainees were
entitled to access to federal court through the writ of habeas corpus,
the U.S. Department of Defense established processes to review the
status of all detainees, many of whom had been held without any pro*

Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law, and Director of Seton Hall
University School of Law Center for Policy and Research.
**
Partner, Denbeaux & Denbeaux. Co-Authors Prof. Mark Denbeaux and Joshua Denbeaux represent two Guantánamo detainees. This Report also benefited
from the research and contributions of Grace Byrd, Jill Camarote, Doug Eadie,
Christopher Fox, Brielle Goldfaden, Mark Muoio, Courtney Ray, Laura Sims, and
Lauren Winchester.
1
This Report, originally published on November 17, 2006, used government data obtained from Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) litigation to profile over 517
detainees held at Guantánamo. The primary sources used were the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) files. Since this Report’s initial publication, the detainee population at Guantánamo has been reduced to 171. The Guantánamo Docket,
N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/held (last visited
Sept. 27, 2011). In addition, more information has been made available through later government releases and WikiLeaks. This Report was not updated based on WikiLeaks. For future reports by the Seton Hall University School of Law Center for Policy
and
Research
(the
“Center”),
visit
the
Center’s
website
at http://law.shu.edu/ProgramsCenters/PublicIntGovServ/policyresearch/Guantan
amo-Reports.cfm.
2
542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004).
3
542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004).
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ceeding for two and a half years. Within one month of Rasul and
Hamdi, the Defense Department created the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) and established a process for hearings before
4
the CSRTs. Each CSRT was composed of three unidentified mem5
bers of the military who presided over the hearings. As soon as most
of the CSRT hearings were completed, the government informed the
district court in which the habeas proceedings were pending that, despite the Supreme Court’s ruling, no further judicial action was nec6
essary because the detainees received CSRT hearings.
This Report analyzes the CSRT proceedings, comparing the
hearing process that the Defense Department promised the detainees
with the process actually provided. The Report is based on the
records that the U.S. government produced for 393 of the 558 detainees who had CSRT hearings until 2004.
The most important documents in this record were produced by
the government in response to orders by U.S. district court judges
that the Department of Defense provide the entire record of the
7
CSRT for review by counsel for at least 102 detainees. These are de8
scribed as habeas-compelled “full CSRT returns.” Without these
documents, it would be possible only to review the process promised.
With the 102 full CSRT returns, this Report can also compare the
process promised with the process provided.
The results of this review are startling. The process that was
promised was modest at best. The process that was actually provided
was far less than the written procedures appeared to require. The de4

Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def. to the Sec’y of the
Navy, (July 7, 2004) [hereinafter Memorandum Establishing CSRT], available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf.
5
Id. at 1.
6
See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484 (granting habeas corpus to Guantánamo detainees);
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538 (leaving open the possibility that a properly constructed military tribunal that affords detainees the fundamental due process guarantees is constitutional). On February 9, 2006, the Department of Defense announced that the
CSRTs were complete. Press Release, Office of the Assistant Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t.
of Def., No. 124-06, Guantánamo Bay Detainee Administrative Review Board Decisions
Completed
(2006),
available
at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2006/02/sec-060209dod01.htm.
7
See Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) & Admin. Review Bd. (ARB) Documents, OFFICE SECRETARY DEF. & JOINT STAFF, U.S. DEP’T DEF.: FOIA REQUEST SERVICE
CENTER,
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans
/Detainee/csrt_arb/index.htm(last visited Oct. 20, 2011)[hereinafter CSRT Documents] (containing CSRT and ARB records).
8
At the time of this writing, only 102 full CSRTs were available. Since 2006,
many more CSRT proceedings have taken place.
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9

tainees were denied any right to counsel. Instead, they were assigned
a “personal representative” who advised each detainee that the personal representative was neither his lawyer nor his advocate and that
10
anything that the detainee said could be used against him. In contrast to the detainee’s lack of counsel, the tribunal was required to
have at least one lawyer and the procedures recommended that the
11
recorder (prosecutor) be a lawyer.
The assigned role of the personal representative was to assist the
12
detainee with presenting his case. In practice, any assistance was
extraordinarily limited. The records of meetings between detainees
and their personal representatives indicate that in 78% of the cases,
the personal representative met with the detainee only once. The
meetings were as short as ten minutes, and this included time for
translation. Approximately 13% of the meetings were twenty minutes
or less, and more than half of the meetings lasted no more than an
hour.
During a meeting, the detainee was told the following:
 The CSRT proceeding was his opportunity to contest the
13
government’s finding that he was an enemy combatant.
 The government had already found the detainee to be
14
an enemy combatant at multiple levels of review.
 The government’s finding rested upon classified evi15
dence that the detainee would not see.
 The tribunal had to presume that the secret classified
16
evidence was reliable and valid.
In the majority of the CSRT hearings, the government rested on
the presumption that the classified evidence was sufficient to estab17
lish that the detainee was an enemy combatant. The government

9

Memorandum from the Deputy Sec’y of Def. to the Sec’ys of the Military
Dep’ts, et al., at Enclosure (1), C(3) (July 14, 2006) [hereinafter Memorandum Procedures
CSRT],
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/news/Aug2006/d20060809CSRTProcedures.pdf.
10
Id.
11
Id. at Enclosure (1), C(2).
12
Id. at Enclosure (3), C.
13
Id. at Enclosure (3), C(1)–(2).
14
Id. at Enclosure (4).
15
Memorandum Procedures CSRT, supra note 9, at Enclosure (3), C(4).
16
See id. at Enclosure (3).
17
See, e.g., Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision at 1, Hicks v.
United States, No. 02-CV-0299 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2004)[hereinafter Summary, Hicks],
available
at
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18

never called any witnesses and rarely adduced unclassified evidence.
In the majority of cases, the government provided the detainee with
no evidence, declassified or classified, that established that the detainee was an enemy combatant. Instead, the government provided the
detainee merely with what it purported to be a summary of the classi19
fied evidence. This summary was so conclusory that it precluded
any meaningful response. The government then relied on the pre20
sumption that the secret evidence was reliable and accurate.
In the minority of cases, the government produced declassified
21
evidence to the tribunal. Such declassified evidence did not bear
directly on the question at issue. It consisted of letters from the detainee’s family and friends asking for his release, portions of habeas
corpus petitions submitted by the detainee’s own lawyers on his behalf in a U.S. district court, and publicly available records that did not
22
mention the detainee by name. None of the declassified evidence
introduced against any detainee contained any specific information
about the government’s basis for the detainee’s detention as an enemy combatant.
Detainees who participated in CSRT proceedings were not able
to confront all of the government’s evidence. The government never
called witnesses and did not typically produce any unclassified evidence. When such evidence was presented to the tribunal, in 93% of
the hearings, the detainee never saw it. Regarding the detainees’
ability to produce evidence, only 11% of the detainees were allowed
to introduce any evidence of their own. The promised CSRT process
23
provided that detainees could call witnesses, but no witness from
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1-91.pdf.
18
See, e.g., id.
19
See, e.g., Letter from Officer in Charge, CSRT, to Pers. Representatives (Sept. 7,
2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/000001000100.pdf.
20
With regard to classified evidence, the tribunal panel stated, “[t]he Tribunal
also relied on certain classified evidence in reaching its decision.” Summary, Hicks,
supra note 17, at 1.
21
See, e.g., Unclassified Summary of Basis For Tribunal Decision at 1–2, Abdullah
v.
Bush,
No.
05-301
(D.D.C.
July
25,
2005),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_92-190.pdf; Unclassified Summary of Basis For Tribunal Decision
at 1–2, Awad v. United States, No. 04-CV-1194 (D.D.C. Oct. 12, 2004), available at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_2991-3070.pdf.
22
See, e.g., id.
23
See Memorandum Procedures CSRT, supra note 9, at Enclosure (1), F(6).
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outside Guantánamo ever appeared. The only witnesses the govern24
ment allowed detainees to call were other detainees. Therefore, the
only witnesses that were allowed under the CSRT process were presumed enemy combatants testifying in favor of other presumed enemy combatants.
The promised CSRT process stated that detainees would be al25
lowed to produce documentary evidence. In operation, the only
documentary evidence that detainees were actually allowed to intro26
duce were letters from family and friends. This was true even when
the documentary evidence sought to be introduced was available and
even when the documents were in the government’s possession—
such as passports. In these cases, the detainee insisted that the documents would prove that the charges against him could not be true,
27
but none of the documents were permitted to be introduced.
The detainee’s personal representative was completely silent in
12% of the hearings, and in only 52% of the hearings did the personal representative make substantive comments. Sometimes, the substantive comments of the personal representative, however, advocated
28
for the government and against the detainee. At the end of the
hearing, the personal representative had a final opportunity to make
comments, but the personal representative explicitly chose not to do
so 98% of the times.
In sum, while the promised procedures stated that detainees
were allowed to present evidence (witnesses and documents), the on24
See, e.g., Memorandum from PR23 to CSRT Legal Advisor, Al Kandari v. Bush,
No. 02-CV-0828 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2004)[hereinafter Memo, Al Kandari], available at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_2737-2868.pdf; Unclassified Summary of Basis For Tribunal Decision at 1, Hassen v. Bush, No. 04-CV-1254 (D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2004)[hereinafter Summary,
Hassen],
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_3444-3577.pdf.
25
See Memorandum Procedures CSRT, supra note 9, at Enclosure (1), G(9)(C).
26
See, e.g., Summarized Detainee Statement at 1–2, Al Wadi v. Bush, No. 04CV1227 (D.D.C. Oct. 12, 2004)[hereinafter Statement, Al Wadi], available at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_444-565.pdf.
27
See e.g., Dep’t of Def., Testimony of Detainees Before the Combatant Status Review
Panel
Set
16,
at
1424–28,
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/Set_16_13
63-1446.pdf.
28
See, e.g., Transcript of CSRT Record at 6–7, Al Hilal v. Bush, No. 05-1048
(D.D.C.
Jul.
11,
2005),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_4818-4946.pdf.
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ly evidence that the detainees were permitted to offer in the vast majority of the cases was their own testimony. As a result, the only option available to the detainee was to make a statement attempting to
rebut what he could glean from the summary of classified evidence
that he could not see. In 81% of the cases reviewed, the tribunals
made the decision the same day as the hearing. Among the 102
records reviewed for this Report, the ultimate decision was always unanimous, and all detainees reviewed were ultimately found to be
enemy combatants. It is true that government statements indicate
that 38 of 558 detainees were ultimately found to not be enemy combatants, but no such determinations are found in the full CSRT
records reviewed.
While all detainees whose CSRT records were reviewed for this
Report were ultimately found to be enemy combatants, not all tribunals found a certain detainee to be an enemy combatant. On
three occasions, a tribunal initially found that the detainee was not an
29
enemy combatant. In such cases, the detainee was never told of this
decision. Instead, the tribunal’s decision was reviewed at multiple levels in the Defense Department chain of command, and eventually a
30
new tribunal was convened. Some detainees, however, were still
31
found to not be enemy combatants. At least one detainee’s record
indicates that after a second tribunal determined that he was no
longer an enemy combatant, the process was repeated, and his case
was sent back for a third hearing after which the tribunal ultimately
32
found him to be an enemy combatant.
II. THE DATA
In response to Rasul and Hamdi, the Department of Defense
33
created the CSRT system and processed each detainee. This Report
analyzes the data released by the Department of Defense about the
CSRT proceedings in response to Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) requests and through discovery during habeas lawsuits. Subs29
This fact is not formally published in any records but was discovered through a
careful review of documents produced under court order in the habeas litigations.
At least one example can be gleaned from the record of ISN 556. Memorandum
from James R. Crisfield Jr., Legal Advisor, to Dir., Combatant Status Review Tribunal
at 2839, Abdulla v. Bush, No. 05-1001 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2006), available at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_2737-2868.pdf.
30
See id.
31
See id.
32
Id.
33
See Memorandum Establishing CSRT, supra note 4.
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tantive data regarding individual detainees has never been voluntarily
released by the Department of Defense.
According to the available Defense Department data, until 2006,
when this Report was compiled, there were 759 total detainees incar34
cerated at Guantánamo since its creation; 558 of those detainees re35
ceived hearings before the CSRT. The Department of Defense presumably created a file for each of the 558 CSRT proceedings, which
we will refer to as the “full CSRT record.” Because the government
has not released these files, except under court orders entered in the
various habeas proceedings, the 102 full CSRT returns were the only
full CSRT records that could be analyzed in this Report.
Each detainee was provided the right to appear before the
36
CSRT. At least 361 detainees chose to participate, and a “Summarized Detainee Statement” was prepared from their testimony in each
37
This Report refers to these “Summarized Detainee Statecase.
ments” as “transcripts” although they are not verbatim records. A
transcript was provided for those hearings in which the detainee was
physically present and for those hearings in which the detainee had
38
the personal representative read a statement into the record. The
Department of Defense initially refused to release any of these transcripts, but a FOIA lawsuit brought by the Associated Press succeeded
39
and these documents were released. This Report examines these
102 full CSRT returns and 356 transcripts as those were the only documents that the government had released at the time the Report was
compiled.

34

See List of Individuals Detained by the Dep’t of Def. at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba from
Jan. 2002 through May 15, 2006, U.S. DEP’T DEF. (May 15, 2006), available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/May2006/d20060515%20List.pdf.
As of October
2011, there are 171 detainees still held at Guantánamo. See The Guantanamo Docket: A
History
of
the
Detainee
Population,
NYTIMES.COM,
available
at
http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo.
35
This Report does not consider the “high value detainees” transferred to Guantánamo Bay in September 2006. See Gerry J. Gilmore, American Forces Press Service,
High-Value Detainees Moved to Gitmo; Bush Proposes Detainee Legislation, DEFENSE.GOV
(Sept. 6, 2006), http://www.defenselink.mil/news/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=721.
36
See Memorandum Procedures CSRT, supra note 9, at Enclosure (4).
37
See CSRT Documents, supra note 7.
38
See, e.g., Summarized Unsworn Detainee Statement, Al Edah v. Bush, No. 05280
(D.D.C.
July
13,
2005),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_191-236.pdf.
39
The Department of Defense released 356 transcripts through the FOIA request; there are five additional detainee transcripts among the 102 full CSRT returns
reviewed in this Report. Therefore, a total of 361 transcripts existed.
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Because only 356 transcripts were released, it can be concluded
that 202 of the 558 detainees did not participate in the CSRT process.
But because five of the 102 full CSRT returns contain transcripts that
were not among the 356 FOIA-released transcripts, it is apparent that
these 356 transcripts did not contain the records of all detainees who
participated in the CSRT.
Although the 102 full CSRT returns contained sixty-nine returns
with transcripts, eleven of the returns with transcripts contained only
conversations between the personal representative and the tribunal.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the 102 full CSRT records reviewed include records of fifty-eight detainees who appeared in the
CSRT proceeding and forty-four detainees who did not physically appear. Additionally, thirty-eight full CSRT returns of detainees did not
have transcripts released in the Associated Press FOIA request; no
other information was released by the Department of Defense.
The 356 FOIA transcripts combined with the thirty-eight full
CSRT returns total 394 detainee records, which make up our full
sample set. These 394 records reveal that 324 detainees physically
appeared before the Tribunal. The data collected on the thirty-eight
detainees without FOIA-released transcripts constitutes the only information available about the 202 detainees whose transcripts were
not produced by the FOIA request.
In short, of the entire 558 detainees at Guantánamo who participated in the CSRT process up until 2006, there was some documentation for 394 detainees: the 356 FOIA-released transcripts (sixty-four
of which also have full CSRT returns) and the 38 full CSRT returns
40
whose transcripts were not released by the FOIA.
III. CREATION OF THE CSRTS
41

Rasul and Hamdi were decided on June 28, 2004. The Department of Defense issued an order establishing the CSRTs on July 7,
42
43
2004 and an order implementing the process on 29, 2004. Guan-

40

The two different data sets upon which this Report is based have been compared with the profile of all of the detainees that was first made public on February 8,
2006. MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., A REPORT ON GUANTÁNAMO DETAINEES: A PROFILE OF
517 DETAINEES THROUGH ANALYSIS OF DEP’T OF DEF. DATA, (2008), available at
http://law.shu.edu/news/Guantánamo_report_final_2_08_06.pdf. The correlation
between the data previously analyzed and the data considered in this Report is very
strong.
41
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
42
Memorandum Establishing CSRT, supra note 4.
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tánamo personnel hand delivered a letter to every detainee, advising
him both of the upcoming CSRT and of his right, independent of the
44
CSRT, to file a habeas corpus suit in a U.S. district court. The entire
45
CSRT procedure was promulgated in only thirty-two days.
As the CSRTs were being convened in Guantánamo, the Department of Defense was responding to habeas proceedings in Washington, D.C. The response, beginning in August 2004, justified the
CSRT as providing the appropriate hearing to which detainees were
46
entitled under Rasul. The goal was to demonstrate that, because a
sufficient hearing had been held for each detainee, no federal court
47
habeas hearings were required.
According to the CSRT procedures established in the July 29,
2004 memorandum, prior to the commencement of any CSRT proceeding, the classified evidence relevant to that detainee had to be
reviewed, a “summary of evidence” prepared, and a personal repre48
sentative appointed for the detainee. The personal representative
then had to meet with the detainee, and then a tribunal would be
49
convened. According to the records reviewed by the Seton Hall Law
50
research team, the first hearing was for detainee ISN 220 and was
held on August 2, 2004. For that hearing, the personal representative
met with the detainee on July 31, 2004—two days after the CSRT pro-

43

Memorandum from Gordon England, Sec’y of the Navy, to the Sec’ys of the
Military Dep’ts, et al. (Jul. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Memorandum Implementing
CSRT], available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2004/d20040730comb.pdf.
44
While the right to proceed in federal court may have been extinguished by the
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in
scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.) at the time, the meaning and constitutionality of that
statute is not addressed by the present Report. Since initial publication, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the detainees at Guantánamo are entitled
to file habeas petitions and to participate in hearings. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723 (2008).
45
See Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) Process at Guantanamo, DEP’T DEF.
(July
2007),
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2007/CSRT%20comparison%20-%20FINAL.pdf.
46
See id.
47
See id.
48
Memorandum Implementing CSRT, supra note 43.
49
Id. at Enclosure (1), G(3).
50
Mr. Abdullah Saleh Ati Ai Ajmi, ISN 220, was represented by counsel in habeas
litigation. He was one of the thirty-five detainees who refused to participate in the
CSRT process but whose full CSRT return was obtained by his attorney under court
order in the habeas litigation. See Decl. of James R. Crisfield Jr., Al Ajmi v. United
States,
No.
02-CV-0828
(D.D.C.
Sept.
15,
2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1344-1475.pdf .
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51

cedures were promulgated. This was the only meeting between detainee ISN 220 and his personal representative; it lasted only twenty
52
minutes, including translation time. On Monday, August 2, 2004,
two days after the meeting between the personal representative and
the detainee, the CSRT was empanelled, the hearing was held, the
53
classified evidence was evaluated, and the decision was issued. De54
tainee 220 did not participate in his CSRT hearing.
The remainder of the habeas detainees whose CSRT returns
were among the 102 considered in this Report were processed rapidly: 49% of the hearings were held and decisions were reached by September 30, 2004; 70% by October 31, 2004; and 96% were completed
by the end of November 2004. The haste of the tribunals can be seen
not only in the scheduling of the hearing but also in the speed with
which the tribunals reached verdicts. In 81% of the 102 full CSRT returns, the tribunal’s decision was reached the same day as the hearing.
In addition, almost 40% of the final administrative decisions
were made after the last tribunal decision. During this six weeks after
the tribunals ended and the bulk of the decisions were made, thirtyfive of the thirty-eight detainees who were found to no longer be
enemy combatants were still detained.
IV. THE DECISION TO PARTICIPATE
Each of the 558 detainees who received a CSRT proceeding was
advised on at least three occasions that he would also have the right
to a habeas corpus proceeding in the United States District Court for
55
the District of Columbia. The Department of Defense order of July
7, 2004, directed that each detainee be informed within ten days that
he was entitled to a CSRT proceeding and that each detainee was also
51
See Detainee Election Form, Al Ajmi v. United States, No. 02-CV-0828 (D.D.C.
Sept.
15,
2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1344-1475.pdf.
52
Id.
53
Memorandum from James R. Crisfield Jr., Legal Advisor, to Dir., Combatant
Status Review Tribunal, Al Ajmi v. United States, No. 02-CV-0828 (D.D.C. Sept. 15,
2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1344-1475.pdf.
54
Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision, Al Ajmi v. United States,
No.
02-CV-0828
(D.D.C.
Sept.
15,
2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1344-1475.pdf.
55
See Memorandum Establishing CSRT, supra note 4, at 1.
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entitled, if the detainee so chose, to proceed with habeas litigation in
56
a U.S. district court to challenge his detention at Guantánamo Bay.
Pursuant to this order, each detainee would receive a hand-delivered
57
formal written notice of his rights.
The English version of the notice, translated for and delivered to
every detainee in accordance with the Defense Department order of
July 7, 2004, provides that:
The U.S. Government will give you an opportunity to contest
your status as an enemy combatant. Your case will go before a
Combatant Status Review Tribunal, composed of military officers.
This is not a criminal trial and the Tribunal will not punish you,
but will determine whether you are properly held. . . .
As a matter separate from these Tribunals, United States
courts have jurisdiction to consider petitions brought by enemy
combatants held at this facility that challenge the legality of their
detention. You will be notified in the near future what procedures are available should you seek to challenge your detention in
the U.S. courts. Whether or not you decide to do so, the Combatant Status Review Tribunal will still review your status as an ene58
my combatant.

This document then informed each detainee that he would be ac59
corded a CSRT, whether or not the detainee chose to participate.
The document also informed the detainee that the CSRT was only
one of his legal rights and that the other was the right to file petitions
60
with “United States courts.”
V. THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
The CSRT procedures provide that each detainee has to be assigned a “personal representative” and require that the personal rep61
resentative meet with the detainee before the CSRT hearing. The
personal representative must advise the detainee of the CSRT process
and remind the detainee, for a second time, that he has an indepen62
dent right to habeas corpus.
The records of meetings between detainees and their personal
representatives indicate that in 78% of the 102 full CSRT returns, the

56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Id.
Memorandum Procedures CSRT, supra note 9, at Enclosure (4).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at Enclosure (1), C(3); id. at Enclosure (3).
Id. at Enclosure (3).
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detainee and the personal representative met only once. Such meetings were typically brief: 91% of these meetings lasted two hours or
less, 51% lasted an hour or less, 6% lasted thirty minutes or less, 13%
lasted twenty minutes or less, and 2% lasted ten minutes or less. The
time spent in the meetings included the time spent translating and
the time spent conveying specific information about the process, the
personal representative’s role, and the option of petitioning the fed63
eral court. The length of these meetings did not leave much time
for detailed communication, much for less meaningful consultation
between the personal representative and the detainee.
At that initial meeting with each detainee, the personal representative had several tasks, including warning the detainee that the
personal representative was not the detainee’s lawyer and that nothing discussed during the meeting would be held in confidence:
I am neither a lawyer nor your advocate, but have been given the
responsibility of assisting your preparation for the hearing. None
of the information you provide me shall be held in confidence and I may be
obligated to divulge it at the hearing. I am available to assist you in
preparing an oral or written presentation to the Tribunal should
64
you desire to do so.

This statement makes clear both that the detainee had no advocate in
the process and that the detainee had the right to not participate in
the process. After receiving this information, 32% of the detainees
opted not to participate in the CSRT proceedings.
The meetings with the personal representatives typically oc65
curred very shortly before the tribunal hearing.
The records of
meetings between detainees and their personal representatives indi63
See, e.g., Detainee Election Form, Modaray v. Bush, No. 05-301 (D.D.C. Jul. 28,
2005),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_815-893.pdf; Detainee Election Form, Al Warafi v. Bush, No. 04CV-1254
(D.D.C.
Oct.
12,
2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_815-893.pdf..
64
See Memorandum Procedures CSRT, supra note 9, at Enclosure (3) (emphasis
added).
65
Compare Detainee Election Form, Hicks v. United States, No. 02-CV-0299
(D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2004) (a meeting with representative on September 17, 2004), available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1-91.pdf, with Combatant Status Review Tribunal Report Cover
Sheet, Hicks v. United States, No. 02-CV-0299 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2004) (tribunal decision reached on September 22, 2004) [hereinafter Statement, Al Hilal], available at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1-91.pdf.
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cate that for 24% of the detainees, the meeting with the personal
representative was held the day of or the day before the CSRT proceeding. For 55% of the detainees, the meeting occurred between
two days and a week before the hearing. Only 7% of the detainees
met with their personal representatives more than two weeks prior to
the CSRT proceeding.
In 52% of the cases, the personal representative made substantive statements to the tribunal. Many times, however, the representatives did not say a word (12%) and other times the representative
made only formal non-substantive comments (36%). Furthermore,
in a number of cases, the personal representative advocated for the
government.
Detainees frequently expressed the view that the CSRT process
was not an opportunity to “contest” their status as enemy combatants
but rather another form of interrogation. Seven percent of the detainees who did physically appear in their CSRT proceeding made voluntary statements on the record indicating that they understood this
to be a continuation of their interrogation and not a true hearing.
The documents show that some detainees objected to the personal representative’s role as an aid to the tribunal rather than as an
66
assistant to the detainee. In 8% of all records reviewed, the detainees suggested, without being asked, that the personal representative
or the tribunal were a form of interrogation rather than a hearing.
In every occasion when the detainee objected to his personal representative serving as the government’s agent against him, the detai67
nee’s objections were ignored.
Contained in the records for detainee ISN 1463 is the following
exchange:
Detainee: My personal representative is supposed to be with me.
Not against me. Now he is talking like he is an interrogator. How
can he be an attorney? I said all of these allegations were fabricated and I told you I had nothing to do with them. It’s up to the
Recorder or Reporter to respond or provide the proof. I’m afraid
to say anything that you might use against me. As you know, there
is no attorney here today and I don’t know anything about the
law. I don’t know which of these statements are going to be used
for me or against me. Whoever is representing the Government
needs to provide evidence.
66

See, e.g., Summarized Detainee Sworn Statement at 6, Al Hilal v. Bush, No. 05148
(D.D.C.
July
11,
2005),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_4818-4946.pdf .
67
See, e.g., id.
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I cannot say anything that can be used against me. I am
even afraid to say what my name is.
Anything else I say, I am afraid is going to be used against
me.
68
I hope that you can forgive me.

Although the CSRT procedure requires the personal representative to advise the detainee of the tribunal process and the detainee’s
rights under the process, the personal representatives on a number of
69
occasions neglected to do this.
Ali Ahmed Mohammed Al Rahizi, ISN 45, did not appear at his
70
Al Rahizi’s personal representative received the
CSRT hearing.
71
“Summary of Evidence” against Al Rahizi on September 23, 2004
72
and met with Al Rahizi for twenty minutes on September 28, 2004.
According to the “Conclusions of the Tribunal” section of the “Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision,” Mr. Al Rahizi declined to participate in his CSRT proceeding:
The detainee understood the Tribunal Proceedings, but chose
not to participate . . . . The Tribunal questioned the personal representative closely on this matter and was satisfied that the personal representative had made every effort to ensure that the de73
tainee had made an informed decision.

The tribunal’s close questioning of the personal representative is
problematic because the form that the personal representative presented to the tribunal stated that he had neither read the written
procedures to the detainee nor left a written copy them with the de74
tainee.

68

Id. at 6–7.
See Detainee Election Form, Al Rahizi v. Bush, No. 04-CV-1194 (D.D.C. Oct. 14,
2004)
[hereinafter
Election
Form,
Al
Rahizi],
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_370-443.pdf.
70
Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision at 1, Al Rahizi v. Bush,
No. 04-CV-1194 (D.D.C. Oct. 14, 2004) [hereinafter Summary, Al Rahizi], available at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_370-443.pdf.
71
See Memorandum from Officer in Charge, to Personal Representative, Al Rahizi v. Bush, No. 04-CV-1194 (D.D.C. Oct. 14, 2004), available at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_370-443.pdf.
72
See Election Form, Al Rahizi, supra note 69.
73
Summary, Al Rahizi, supra note 70.
74
Election Form, Al Rahizi, supra note 69.
69
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According to the CSRT record, Mr. Al Rahizi’s brother submit75
ted a sworn affidavit on his behalf. The tribunal declined to consider the sworn affidavit, determined that the detainee had chosen not
to participate in the CSRT, and found Mr. Al Rahizi to be an enemy
76
combatant. The personal representative made no comment during
77
the proceeding.
At least once, the personal representative did not advise the detainee of his right to appear before the tribunal until after that hearing had already taken place and the tribunal made its decision. Every
personal representative was required to complete a “Detainee Election Form” as soon as the representative finished the first meeting
78
with a detainee. In the case of Musa Abed Al Wahab, ISN 58, the
CSRT “Decision Report Cover Sheet” concluded that the tribunal determined that the detainee was an enemy combatant following an October 20, 2004, hearing, in which the detainee chose not to partici79
pate. There is nothing remarkable about this except for the fact
80
that the Detainee Election Form was dated October 25, 2004. It is not
clear how the personal representative could have advised the tribunal
that the detainee had affirmatively declined to participate when he
had yet to meet with the detainee.
VI. BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTION
OF VALIDITY OF GOVERNMENT EVIDENCE
A. Burden of Proof
The published rules for CSRT proceedings formally place the
burden of proof that the detainee is an enemy combatant upon the
government, not the detainee: “Tribunals shall determine whether
75
Affidavit of Abdullah Ahmed Muhammed al Rezehi, Admin. Review Bd.,
Round
1
Transcripts,
available
at
http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/45-ali-ahmad-muhammad-alrahizi/documents/2.
76
Id. at 2.
77
Id.
78
See, e.g., Detainee Election Form, Al Wahab v. Bush, No. 05-520 (D.D.C. May 6,
2005)
[hereinafter
Election
Form,
Al
Wahab],
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_444-565.pdf.
79
Combatant Status Review Tribunal Decision Report Cover Sheet, Al Wahab v.
Bush,
No.
05-520
(D.D.C.
May
6,
2005),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_444-565.pdf
80
Election Form, Al Wahab, supra note 78.
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the preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion that each
detainee meets the criteria to be designated as an enemy comba81
tant.” This language might seem inconsistent with the language of
the notice that was read to each detainee to inform him of the CSRT
procedures:
The U.S. Government will give you an opportunity to contest your
status as an enemy combatant. Your case will go before a Combatant Status Review Tribunal, composed of military officers. This is
not a criminal trial and the Tribunal will not punish you, but will
82
determine whether you are properly held . . . .

The language “an opportunity to contest your status as an enemy com83
batant” might suggest that it is the detainee, and not the government, who bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that the detainee is not an enemy combatant. Indeed, the order also refers to the
determination of combatant status made before the CSRT process:
“Each detainee subject to this Order has been determined to be an
enemy combatant through multiple levels of review by officers of the De84
partment of Defense.” Further, the summary of evidence, which the
personal representative provided to each detainee at the start of their
first meeting, repeats this refrain. Each summary of evidence includes the following statement:
The United States Government has previously determined that the
detainee is an enemy combatant. This determination is based on
information possessed by the United States that indicates that the
85
detainee is . . . .

In sum, while the burden of proof was placed formally on the
government, the controlling documents clearly suggest the presumptive correctness of the detentions. A tribunal would have to find that
“multiple levels” of military review were all in error in order to find a
detainee to not be an enemy combatant. In any event, the debate
about who bore the burden of proof may not be worth pursuing in
light of the presumption mandated by the procedures that the evidence was valid. The presumption is detailed below.

81

See Memorandum Procedures CSRT, supra note 9, at Enclosure (1), G(11).
Id. at Enclosure (4).
83
Id. (emphasis added).
84
See Memorandum Establishing CSRT, supra note 4 (emphasis added).
85
See, e.g., See Memorandum from Officer in Charge, to Pers. Representative, Al
Rahizi v. Bush, No. 04-CV-1194 (D.D.C. Oct. 14, 2004) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_370-443.pdf.
82
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B. Presumption of Validity of Government Evidence
While the CSRT procedures formally placed the burden of persuasion on the government, they simultaneously mandate that the
tribunal consider the classified evidence as presumptively valid:
There is a rebuttable presumption that the Government Evidence, as defined in paragraph H(4) herein, submitted by the
Recorder to support a determination that the detainee is an ene86
my combatant, is genuine and accurate.

The effect of this presumption of validity of classified evidence is to
meet, if not lift, the government’s burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the detainee was properly classified as an
enemy combatant. The detainee is presumed to be an enemy combatant based upon the classified evidence. Although the detainee may,
in theory, rebut the presumption, the requirement that the detainee
does so effectively shifts the burden of persuasion to him.
However objectionable it may be to place the burden of proof
on the government with one hand and simultaneously presume that
it is satisfied with the other, the CSRT procedures are even more
problematic in light of their concomitant command that the detainee
87
be denied access to the evidence itself. The evidentiary presumption might in theory be rebuttable, but because the evidence is classified and kept secret from the detainee, he is unable to challenge, explain, or simply rebut it. The rebuttable presumption of validity
becomes, in practice, an irrebuttable presumption.
This explains why, although the burden of proof was supposedly
on the government, the government never had to present a single
witness at any of the 393 CSRT hearings. Instead, it relied almost exclusively on the secret, and presumptively valid, classified evidence.
In reality, the burden was on the detainee to prove that the classified
evidence was wrong. Yet, the detainee was denied access to the evidence that might have enabled him to do so.
VII. THE HEARING
88

Each CSRT took place in a small room. Armed guards brought
the detainee—shackled hand and foot—to the room, seated him in a
86

See Memorandum Procedures CSRT, supra note 9, at Enclosure (1), G(11).
See id.
88
Photographs
of
the
CSRT
rooms
are
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/news/combatant_tribunalsarchive.html. See also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, First Military Commission Convened at Guantánamo
Bay, Cuba (Aug. 24, 2004) [hereinafter First Commission], available at
http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7667; Tim Golden, For
87
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89

chair against the wall and chained his shackled legs to the floor.
The detainee faced the recorder (the prosecutor for this proceeding), the personal representative (seated beside the recorder), a para90
legal, and the interpreter. The three tribunal members, all military
91
officers, sat to the right of the detainee behind the covered table.
VIII. THE EVIDENCE
Typically, the government provided the detainee with only a
document known as the “Unclassified Summary of the Evidence” that
92
was marked R-1 by the recorder. The boilerplate “Discussion of Unclassified Evidence” in most records reads: “Exhibit R-1 is the Unclassified Summary of Evidence. While this summary is helpful in that it
provides a broad outline of what the tribunal can expect to see, it is
not persuasive in that it provides conclusory statements without sup93
porting unclassified evidence.”
The “Unclassified Summary of Evidence” often made it impossible for detainees to address its thrust. For example, the transcript of
the proceeding for detainee ISN 1463 recounts:
Detainee: That is not true. I did not help anybody and whoever is
saying that I did, let them present their evidence. If I know that
somebody presented any evidence, then somebody can tell me
what that evidence is so that I can respond to it. If there is any
....
Detainee: That’s not true. Again, whoever has any evidence to
prove, let them present it. If somebody submitted any evidence,
I’d like to take a look at it to find out if that evidence is true . . . .
....
Detainee: It’s not fair for me if you mask some of the secret in94
formation . . . . How can I defend myself?

The CSRT procedures accord a broad range of powers to the
tribunal for the production of evidence. The tribunal has the power
Guantánamo Review Boards, Limits Abound, NYTIMES.COM (Dec. 31, 2006), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/31/us/31gitmo.html?scp=2&sq=describe+comba
tant+status+review+tribunals&st=nyt.
89
See, e.g., id.
90
Pictures
of
the
rooms’
layout
are
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/news/combatant_tribunalsarchive.html. (emphasis added)
91
See supra note 90.
92
See, e.g., Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision at 2, Al Wadi v.
Bush,
No.
04-CV-1227
(D.D.C.
Oct.
12,
2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_444-565.pdf.
93
See, e.g., id.
94
Statement, Al Hilal, supra note 66, at 3.
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to order members of the U.S. military to appear as witnesses, the
95
power to request civilian witnesses to testify, and the power to order
production of any document in the possession of the U.S. govern96
ment. Despite these powers, the government did not produce a single witness—military or civilian—during the unclassified portion of
any of the 393 detainees’ records. The CSRT procedures give the de97
tainee a right to question witnesses against him, but that right is only
theoretical because the government never presented any witnesses.
A. Government Unclassified Documentary Evidence
The CSRT procedures anticipate that the government will produce unclassified evidence at the hearing. The procedures explicitly
require that the personal representative advise the detainee of his
98
right to see such unclassified evidence. According to the 102 full
CSRT returns, the government did not present any witnesses and
rarely presented non-testimonial evidence to the detainee prior to
the hearing. A review of the 361 transcripts reveals that the government may have shown the detainee some evidence before he began
his statement in 4% of the cases. When the hearing began, 89% of
the detainees had no facts to rebut, whether from witnesses or from
documentary evidence. The same documents also reveal that the tribunal showed the detainee unclassified information in 7% of the
hearings. It is unclear why the tribunal showed unclassified evidence
in some cases but not in others.
As explained below, 49% of the 102 full CSRT returns contain
some form of unclassified evidence presented by the government.
This number is in stark contrast to the 4% of detainees who had
access to unclassified information prior to their hearings and to the
7% of detainees who were shown unclassified information during
their hearings.
Each CSRT return includes an “Unclassified Summary of the Basis for Tribunal Decision,” including the unclassified evidence against
99
the detainee. Twenty-nine of the 102 full CSRT returns also contain

95

See Memorandum Procedures CSRT, supra note 9, at Enclosure (1), E(2).
Id. at Enclosure (1), E(3).
97
Id. at Enclosure (1), H(7).
98
Id. at Enclosure (3).
99
See, e.g., Summary, Hicks, supra note 17; Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision, Ruhani v. Bush, No. 05-2367 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 2006), available at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1-91.pdf; Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision,
Wasiq v. Bush, No. 05-2386 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2006), available at
96
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a recorder’s “Exhibit List,” which cites every piece of classified and
100
unclassified evidence that the tribunal considers.
In addition,
sometimes unclassified evidence is appended to the full CSRT re101
turns. These appended exhibits may or may not be listed in either
the recorder’s “Exhibit List” or the “Unclassified Summary of Basis
for Tribunal Decision.” Based on these three sources, unclassified
evidence against detainees appears in 48% of the 102 full CSRT returns. Thus, for 52% of the CSRT hearings, the government had no
unclassified evidence and relied solely upon the presumptively valid
classified evidence to meet its burden of proof.
1.

Types of Government Unclassified Evidence Presented
to Tribunal

The government introduced five types of unclassified evidence
in the CSRT hearing:
102
 documents from friends and family
103
 submissions from habeas corpus litigation
 publicly available documents either released by the Government or published by the press that name the detainee
104
at issue
 publicly available documents either released by the Government or published by the press that do not name the
105
detainee
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1-91.pdf.
100
See, e.g., Recorder Exhibit List for [REDACTED], Al Murbati v. Bush, No. 04CV-1227
(D.D.C.
Oct.
12,
2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_444-565.pdf.
101
See, e.g., Summary, Al Wadi, supra note 92.
102
See e.g., Answers to the Questions for the Family of Abd Alaziz Sayir Al Shamari, Al Shammeri v. United States, No. 02-CV-0828 (D.C.C. Oct. 15, 2004)[hereinafter
Answers,
Al
Shamari],
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1344-1475.pdf.
103
See e.g., Amended Complaint, Al Odah v. United States, No. CV 02-0828 (D.D.C
July
8,
2002),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1344-1475.pdf.
104
See e.g., Executive Order 13224, Abdullah v. Bush, No. 05-301(D.D.C. July 25,
2005),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_92-190.pdf.
105
See e.g., Terrorist Organization Reference Guide, U.S. Bureau of Border Protection, Qadir v. Bush, No. 05-2370 (D.D.C. Jan. 4, 2007), available at
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non-publicly available documents that particularly con106
cern the detainee
For 47% of the detainees whose tribunal considered unclassified
documents, this evidence consisted of documents and letters written
by friends and family of the detainees. Correspondence written by
family and friends generally lacks inculpatory value. Eighteen percent of the records contained habeas corpus pleadings. Motions taken from habeas corpus proceedings also lack inculpatory value. Of
the full CSRT returns that considered unclassified documents, 29%
contained public records that did not refer to the detainees. The inculpatory value of these documents is tenuous because the documents were used to establish that certain groups are terrorist organizations; they did not, however, directly accuse the detainee of any
107
wrongdoing.
Of the full CSRT returns that reflected unclassified
documents, 10% contained public records that identified the detainee by name. The inculpatory value of these documents is more apparent. An additional 14% of the sample set contained non-publicly
available documents directly pertinent to the detainee. Included in
this group were documents labeled “For Official Use Only”
108
(FOUO), discussed below, as well as Bosnian court investigation
109
110
documents and a mental health record. The inculpatory value of
these documents seems more apparent; however, there is no indication the detainees ever saw these documents.
Most unclassified documents in a detainee’s full CSRT return
did not allow the detainee to effectively contest his status as an enemy
combatant, particularly when the detainee was not allowed to view
this unclassified evidence.

http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1344-1475.pdf.
106
See, e.g., Answers, Al Shamari, supra note 102, at 3.
107
See, e.g., Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision, Mahnut v. Bush,
No. 05-1704 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 2004)[hereinafter Summary, Mahnut], available at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1893-2014.pdf .
108
See, e.g., Recorder Exhibit List, Hicks v. United States, No. 02-CV-0299 (D.D.C.
Oct.
1,
2004)[Exhibit
List,
Hicks],
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1-91.pdf.
109
See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
110
Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision, Mahdi v. Bush, No.05665 (July 13, 2004)[hereinafter Summary, Mahdi] (mental health records), available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_3291-3416.pdf.
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2.

Unclassified FOUO Evidence Withheld from Detainee

Unclassified evidence included, but was not limited to, documents labeled FOUO. These documents, however, were consistently
treated as if they were classified throughout the CSRT process. For
example, the record did not discuss these documents in the “Unclas111
sified Summary of the Basis for Tribunal Decision.”
The FOUO
112
documents primarily consisted of interrogations of the detainee.
Without access to these FOUO documents, the detainee was not able
to clarify the statements made, claim that the statements were made
as a result of torture, or dispute whether the statements were made at
all.
The existence and reliance upon FOUO evidence was not revealed in any of the 356 FOIA-produced transcripts. In most instances, the existence of FOUO evidence was revealed in the “Recorder’s Exhibit List,” which was produced only as part of the habeas113
compelled full CSRT returns. Consequently, but for the habeas petitions, the government’s reliance on this variety of secret evidence
would never have been revealed.
Recorder’s exhibit lists were found for only 28% of the detainees’ full CSRT returns. Exhibit lists, when present, however, show
that the government relied upon unclassified FOUO evidence for
83% of the hearings. The record also shows that when the government relied upon unclassified FOUO evidence, this evidence was always withheld from the detainee. In essence, the detainees were not
shown any of the evidence used against them, classified or unclassified. Not only was the FOUO evidence withheld from the detainees
in violation of the CSRT procedures, but other declassified evidence
was also withheld.
B. The Detainee’s Opportunity to Present His Evidence
Records indicate that, other than the unclassified summary of
evidence, as many as 96% of the detainees began the presentation of
their cases without hearing or seeing any facts upon which the government based its determination that the detainee was an enemy
combatant. Detainees presented their cases without knowing the
facts they had to rebut.

111
112
113

See, e.g., Summary, Hicks, supra note 17.
See, e.g., Exhibit List, Hicks, supra note 108.
See, e.g., id.

DENBEAUX & DENBEAUX_NO HEARING_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

11/22/2011 9:09 AM

NO HEARING HEARINGS

1253

The CSRT procedures provided that each detainee would have
the right to present evidence to the tribunal. The CSRT procedures
provide that:
(6) The detainee may present evidence to the Tribunal, including the
testimony of witnesses who are reasonably available and whose testimony is considered by the Tribunal to be relevant. Evidence on
the detainee’s behalf (other than his own testimony, if offered)
may be presented in documentary form and through written
114
statements, preferably sworn.

Of the detainees who chose to participate in their hearings,
115
more than half (55%) attempted to not only inspect the classified
(or perhaps unclassified) evidence but also to produce their own witnesses or documentary evidence. Most requests for the production of
116
evidence at the hearing, however, were denied.
1.

Witness Requests

One-third of detainees who participated in their hearings requested that witnesses testify on their behalf. Other detainees re117
fused to participate because their requests were denied. Among the
records, only 26% of the detainees that requested witnesses were able
to get any of those witnesses produced by the tribunal. Of the detainees who requested the testimony of other detainees at Guantánamo,
83% were denied.
Further inspection of the data reveals that only 4% of these detainees were able to obtain all of their requested witnesses, and 22%
of these detainees were able to have only some of their witnesses produced. In total, 74% of the detainees who requested witnesses were
denied the production of any witnesses by the tribunal. The tribunal
denied witness requests if it deemed the witnesses either “not reasonably available,” “irrelevant,” or, in at least one egregious example, be-

114
See Memorandum Implementing CSRT, supra note 43, at Enclosure 1, F(6)
(emphasis added).
115
Some detainees sought more than one kind of evidence, such as witnesses,
non-testimonial evidence, or the opportunity to review classified evidence. The analysis that follows reviews the evidence requested and permitted without associating it
with the total requests of any particular detainee.
116
See, e.g., Memorandum from Legal Advisor to Dir., Combatant Status Review
Tribunal at 3, Begg v. Bush, 04-CV-1137 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2004), available at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/publicly_filed_CSRT_records_28
69-2990.pdf.
117
See, e.g., Memo, Al Kandari, supra note 24.
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cause “the Tribunal would have been burdened with repetitive, cu118
mulative testimony.”
For example, ISN 277 requested seventeen witnesses. The tribunal president decided that the detainee could only have two of
these witnesses because he determined that “all of the witnesses
119
would probably testify similarly, if not identically.”
The tribunal
president gave no basis for the belief that the witnesses would testify
similarly or identically, and, as ISN 277’s personal representative
pointed out to the tribunal, there was no basis in the CSRT proce120
dures for denying a witness based on redundancy.
Some detainees requested witnesses located outside Guantánamo, and some requested witnesses from within the base—but in ei121
ther case, they called for the testimony of another detainee.
More
than half of the detainees who requested witnesses requested the testimony of witnesses who were not at Guantánamo. All requests for the
122
testimony of detainees not detained at Guantánamo were denied.
The detainees who asked for witnesses from inside Guantánamo were
successful in producing some of those witnesses only 50% of the time.
Nineteen percent of the participating detainees requested witnesses from outside Guantánamo, but these requests were never successful. Thus, as the data shows, the only witnesses that any of the detainees were able to produce to testify on their behalf were other
123
Guantánamo detainees.
The “Unclassified Summary of the Basis
for Tribunal Decision” lists the evidence that was considered and the
124
The data shows that
evidence that the tribunal did not consider.
only 26% of the detainees who requested witnesses had witnesses
whose testimony was considered by the tribunal. Broken down further, the data shows that the tribunal considered all witnesses testimony for those detainees who requested witnesses only in 4% of the
cases. All of the witnesses considered were detainees testifying for
118

Summary, Mahnut, supra note 107, at 2.
Id.
120
Id.
121
See, e.g, Summary, Hassen, supra note 24, at 2; Summary, Mahdi, supra note
110,
at
2
(mental
health
records),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_3291-3416.pdf; Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision at 2–3, Al Kandari v. Bush, 02-CV-0828 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2004), available at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_2737-2868.pdf.
122
See, e.g., Summary, Hassen, supra note 24, at 1.
123
See, e.g., id.
124
See, e.g., Summary, Hicks, supra note 17.
119
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each other. In sum, the detainees were denied the right to produce
any testimonial evidence other than, in some circumstances, the testimony of some of their fellow detainees.
2.

Unclassified and Classified Evidence Requests

Twenty-nine percent of the detainees requested unclassifieddocumentary evidence prior to their hearings. For the detainees who
requested unclassified evidence, it was only produced 40% of the
time. Twenty-five percent of the detainees who requested this evidence had all of their evidence produced, while 15% of these detainees had only some of the requested evidence produced. The documentary evidence that the tribunal allowed consisted mostly of letters
from parents and friends and were accorded little weight by the tri125
bunal.
During their hearings, more than 14% of the detainees requested the opportunity to view the classified evidence against
126
127
them. These requests were always denied.
4.

Evidence Detainees Were Permitted to Present

The tribunals denied more evidence than they permitted and
denied almost all evidence that would be persuasive. As discussed
previously, detainees’ requests for witnesses not detained at Guantá128
namo were always rejected, and detainees’ requests to see any of the
129
government’s classified evidence were always denied.
Detainees’
130
requests for testimony from other detainees were usually denied.
125

See, e.g., Statement, Al Wadi, supra note 26.
An examination of the 361 available transcripts reveals that 18% made a request for classified evidence, but, for purposes of this section, analyzing all evidentiary requests, the 14% statistic corresponds to our sample set, the 102 full CSRT returns.
127
See Tribunal Members Questions to Detainee at 12, Amin v. Bush, No. 02CV0828 (D.D.C. Dec. 29, 2004)(on file with Center).
128
See, e.g., Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision at 1–2, Jarabh v.
Bush,
No.
04-CV-1194
(D.D.C.
Oct.
1,
2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1625-1730.pdf; cf. Summary, Hicks, supra note 17, at 3 (granting
the detainee’s witness request initially but never procuring the witness for the detainee).
129
See, Memorandum Procedures CSRT, supra note 9, at Enclosure (1).
130
See, e.g., Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision at 2, Al Rawi v.
Bush, No. 04-CV-1144 (D.D.C. Oct. 22, 2004) (denying request for detainee’s witness),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_4103-4236.pdf; cf. Summary, Hassen, supra note 24, at 1–2 (granting detainee’s witness request).
126
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The detainees, however, were allowed to present their documentary
evidence, at least in part, 40% of the time.
The picture of the type of evidence that was permitted is bleak.
But, when the number of detainees who had any evidence to present
upon their behalf is considered, the picture is bleaker still. Based
upon the 361 available transcripts, for as many as 89% of detainees,
no evidence was presented on their behalf. The evidence in support
of the remaining 11% was limited to testimony from other detainees
and letters from friends and families. Taken as a whole, 96% of the
detainees were shown no facts by the government to support their detention as enemy combatants, and 89% of the detainees had no evidence of their own to present. The 11% who did proffer evidence
were allowed to introduce only unpersuasive evidence: family letters
and other testimony from other detainees.
5.

Reasons for Denying the Detainees’ Evidence

The CSRT procedures empower the tribunal to “[o]rder U.S.
military witnesses to appear and to request the appearance of civilian
witnesses if, in the judgment of the tribunal president those witnesses
131
are reasonably available.” The procedures also permit the CSRT Tribunal to:
request the production of such reasonably available information in
the possession of the U.S. Government bearing on the issue of
whether the detainee meets the criteria to be designated as an
enemy combatant, including information generated in connection with the initial determination to hold the detainee as an
enemy combatant and in any subsequent reviews of that determination, as well as any records, determinations, or reports generat132
ed in connection with such proceedings.

The CSRT procedures do not define “reasonably available,” and
the detainee has no right to appeal a determination that certain evidence is either unavailable or “irrelevant.” The reasons that the tribunals gave for the refusal to allow detainees to present evidence
vary. The three most common reasons were:
133
 The evidence or witness was not “reasonably available.”
134
 The evidence or witness was not relevant.
131

See Memorandum Procedures CSRT, supra note 9, at Enclosure (1), E(2) (emphasis added).
132
Id. at Enclosure (1), E(3) (emphasis added).
133
See, e.g., Unclassified Summary of Basis For Tribunal Decision at 2, Al Hajj v.
Bush,
No.
04-CV-1166
(D.D.C.
Oct.
30,
2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_5069-5181.pdf.
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The request for production of evidence or the witness
was not made to the personal representative during the
135
D-A meeting and was thus too late.
The tribunals sometimes did not give any reason for denying
evidence. Sometimes, the tribunals also refused to permit the introduction of documentary evidence in the possession of the government. For example, Al Harbi, ISN 333, appeared before a tribunal
and identified documents that he said would exonerate him and explain that he was not an enemy combatant: “It is important you find
the notes on my visa and passport because they show I was there for 8
days and could not have been expected to go to Afghanistan and en136
gage in hostilities against anyone.”
During the proceeding for detainee ISN 680, the following exchange took place:
Questions to Recorder by Tribunal Members
Q: Are you aware if the passport is in control of the U.S. Government here in Guantánamo?
A: No, sir, I’m not aware.
Questions to Detainee by Tribunal Members
Q: If we were to see a copy of your passport, what are the dates it
would say you are in Pakistan?
A: The date of my entry to Pakistan, the dates I have on my visa,
they all exist there. Even in Pakistan, we were received by American investigators. We were interrogated by American interrogators in Pakistan.
Q: How long have you been here at the camp?
137
A: I really don’t know anymore, but most likely 2 to 2 1/2 years.

The passport was neither located nor produced, and the detainee was
138
promptly found to be an enemy combatant.
134

See, e.g., Unclassified Summary of Basis For Tribunal Decision at 2, Al Raimi v.
Bush,
No.
04-CV-1194
(D.D.C.
Oct.
1,
2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_977-1088.pdf.
135
See, e.g., Unclassified Summary of Basis For Tribunal Decision at 2, Mar’i v.
Bush,
No.
04-CV-1254
(D.D.C.
Oct.
12,
2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_3071-3189.pdf.
136
Summarized Sworn Detainee Statement at 3, Al Harbi v. United States, (D.D.C.
Sept.
27,
2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/Set_16_13
63-1446.pdf.
137
Summarized Sworn Detainee Statement at 2, Hassan v. United States, No. 04CV-1194
(D.D.C
May
1,
2005),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_3417-3443.pdf.
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For Khi Ali Gul, ISN 928, the Tribunal President said:
[W]e will keep this matter open for a reasonable period of time;
that is, if we receive back from Afghanistan this witness request,
even if we close the proceedings today, with new evidence, we
would be open to introducing or re-introducing any witness
139
statements we might receive.

Khi Ali Gul requested that his brother be produced as a witness and
provided the tribunal with his brother’s telephone number and ad140
dress. Instead of calling the phone number provided, which might
have produced an immediate result, the government instead sent a
141
request to the Afghan embassy.
The Afghan embassy did not re142
The
spond within thirty days, and the witness was not produced.
tribunal then found that the witness was not “reasonably available,”
determined that the detainee was an enemy combatant, and never
143
reopened the hearing.
In another case, an Algerian detainee requested court documents from an earlier hearing in Bosnia at which the Bosnian courts
144
acquitted him of terrorist activities.
The tribunal concluded that
these official court documents were not “reasonably available” even
though the “Unclassified Summary of the Basis for Decision” discussed another document from the same Bosnian legal proceed145
ings. The aspects of the Bosnian proceedings that the tribunal con146
sidered were not the records that the detainee requested.
Apparently, according to the government, some records from a formal Bosnian trial are “reasonably available” but others are not. The
record provided no explanation as to why the government did not

138

See generally id.
Summarized Sworn Detainee Statement at 2, Gul v. Bush, No. 05-00877(D.D.C.
May.
31,
2005),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_4237-4315.pdf.
140
Id. at 3.
141
Id. at 2.
142
Id.
143
Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision at 2, Gul v. Bush, No. 0500877
(D.D.C.
May
31,
2005),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_4237-4315.pdf.
144
Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision at 2, Al Hajj v. Bush, No.
04-CV-1166
(D.D.C.
Oct.
30,
2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_5069-5181.pdf.
145
Id. at 3.
146
Id.
139
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obtain the requested records. The tribunal found that this detainee,
147
like the others, was an enemy combatant.
In the case of Allal Ab Aljallil Abd Al Rahman Abd, ISN 156, the
detainee sought the production of medical records from a specified
hospital:
During the hearing, the detainee requested that the Tribunal
President obtain medical records from a hospital in Jordan. . . .
The Tribunal president denied the request. He determined that,
since the detainee failed to provide specific information about the
documents when he previously met with his Personal Representative, the request was untimely and the evidence was not reasona148
bly available.

The detainee’s failure to mention this request to his personal representative is not a reason to deny the evidence, at least according to
149
the CSRT procedures.
CSRT procedures provide two reasons to
deny requested evidence: that it is irrelevant and that it is “not rea150
sonably available.”
VIII. TRIBUNAL EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE
Once the detainee leaves the hearing chamber, the tribunal is
supposed to review and evaluate the classified evidence for the first
time. What occurred after each detainee left the hearing was never
recorded or at least no record has been released. While we have no
access to the classified evidence, much of the classified evidence was
apparently hearsay. The CSRT procedures permit the use of hearsay,
but require the tribunal to first determine the reliability of the hearsay:
The Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence such as would
apply in a court of law. Instead, the Tribunal shall be free to consider any information it deems relevant and helpful to a resolution of the issue before it. At the discretion of the Tribunal, for example, it may consider hearsay evidence, taking into account the
151
reliability of such evidence in the circumstances.

147

Id. at 1.
Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision, at 2, Al Rahman Abd v.
Bush,
No.
06-CV-1254
(D.D.C
Oct
18,
2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_815-893.pdf.
149
See generally Memorandum Procedures CSRT, supra note 9.
150
Memorandum Procedures CSRT, supra note 9, at Enclosure (1), F(6).
151
Id. at Enclosure (1), (G)7 (emphasis added).
148
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The tribunal’s basis for decision describes the rationale for de152
termining that a detainee is an enemy combatant. A review of the
102 full CSRT returns, however, shows that the tribunal apparently
never questioned the reliability of hearsay. Three issues compound
the severity of the tribunal’s failure to evaluate the reliability of the
hearsay. First, the source of the hearsay was usually anonymous;
second, there was great confusion about the names of the detainees;
and third, there was some evidence of the coercion of declarants.
A. Hearsay from Anonymous Sources
153

A legal adviser reviewed each tribunal decision. It is not possible to definitively analyze the quality of the hearsay evidence because
it is unavailable, but the statement of the legal adviser reviewing the
tribunal’s decision for ISN 552 demonstrates the problem:
Indeed, the evidence considered persuasive by the Tribunal is
made up almost entirely of hearsay evidence recorded by unidentified individuals with no first hand [sic] knowledge of the events
154
they describe.

Outside of the CSRT process, this type of evidence is more commonly
referred to as “rumor.”
In one instance, the personal representative made the following
comments regarding the record of proceedings for ISN 32:
I do not believe the Tribunal gave full weight to the exhibits regarding ISN [redacted]’s truthfulness regarding the time frames
in which he saw various other ISNs in Afghanistan. It is unfortunate that the 302 in question was so heavily redacted that the Tribunal could not see that while ISN [redacted] may have been a
couple months off in his recollection of ISN [redacted]’s appearance with an AK 47, that he was six months to a year off in his recollections of other Yemeni detainees he identified. I do feel with
some certainty that ISN [redacted] has lied about other detainees
to receive preferable treatment and to cause them problems while
in custody. Had the Tribunal taken this evidence out as unreliable, then the position we have taken is that a teacher of the Koran

152

See, e.g., Summary, Hicks, supra note 17, at 1.
See, e.g., Memorandum from James R. Crisfield Jr., Legal Advisor, to Dir., Combatant Status Review Tribunal, Al Kandari v. United States, No. 02-CV-0828 (D.D.C.
Oct.
22,
2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_2737-2868.pdf.
154
See, e.g., id.
153
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(to the Taliban’s children) is an enemy combatant (partially be155
cause he slept under a Taliban roof).

B. Possible False Identities or Misnomers
It is black-letter evidence law in a normal settings that, while
hearsay may sometimes be admissible, the reliability of hearsay evi156
dence always depends upon the reliability of the hearsay declarant.
Because the government’s own records misidentified the detainees
more than 150 times, the problem of reliability in the case of the de157
tainees is apparent’.
On April 19, 2006, the government published the names of the
158
558 detainees who had CSRT proceedings at Guantánamo. On May
15, 2006, the government also published a list of 759 names that
represented all those detainees who were detained at Guantánamo
159
until then.
In addition, the government released transcripts and
other documents related to administrative review board hearings that
160
also contain detainee names.
These three groups of records contain more than 900 different
versions of detainee names. Adding other government documents,
such as the full CSRT returns and other legal documents, the number
rises to more than 1,000 different names. Yet, according to the government, only 759 detainees have passed through Guantánamo “from
161
January 2002 through May 15, 2006.” The more than 1,000 different names do not mean that there were more than 1,000 detainees at
155

Personal Representative Review of the Record of Proceedings, Ahmed v. Bush,
No.
05-301
(D.D.C.
July
25,
2005),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_92-190.pdf.
156
See FED. R. EVID. 801–07.
157
Documents showing a comparison of names throughout the CSRT and Administrative Review Board process are on file with the Center.
158
List of Detainees Who Went Through Complete CSRT Process, FIDH,
http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/doc_7_-_detainee_list.pdf.(last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
159
List of Individuals Detained by the Department of Defense at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba
DEF.,
from
January
2002
Through
May
15,
2006,
U.S.
DEP’T
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/detaineesFOIArelease15May2006.pdf.Gua
ntánamo (last visited Sept 1, 2011) [hereinafter List of Individuals Detained].
160
The procedures provide that each prisoner found to be an enemy combatant
must go through an administration review board process every year following the
CSRT’s conclusion that the detainee is an enemy combatant. Memorandum from
the Deputy Sec’y of Def. to the Sec’ys of the Military Dep’ts, et al., at Enclosure (3)
(July
14,
2006),
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/news/Aug2006/d20060809ARBProceduresMemo.pdf (describing the ARB procedures).
161
List of Individuals Detained, supra note 159.
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Guantánamo, but it does establish the difficulty of identifying individuals in these circumstances.
If after more than four years of interrogation the government
did not know the names of its own detainees, confusion about the
identity of detainees clouded any analysis of the evidence at the CSRT
hearings. In short, there should be considerable concern when a tribunal relies upon hearsay declarants who may be talking about
someone other than the detainee to whom the declaration is supposedly directed. For example, one detainee responded to the claim
that his name was found “on a document.” The detainee stated:
There are several tribes in Saudi Arabia and one of these tribes is
Al Harbi. This is part of my names [sic] and there are literally
millions that share Al Harbi as part of their name. Further, my
first names Mohammad and Atiq are names that are favored in
that region. Just knowing someone has the name Al Harbi tells
you where they came from in Saudi Arabia. Where I live, it is not
uncommon to be in a group of 8–10 people and 1 or 2 of them
will be named Mohammed Al Harbi. If fact, I know of 2 Mohammed Al Harbis here in Guantánamo Bay and one of them is
in Camp 4. The fact that this name is recovered on a document is
162
literally meaningless.

C. Possible Coercion
Apparently no tribunal considered the extent to which the government obtained any hearsay evidence through coercion. While the
effects of torture, or coercion more generally, would obviously apply
to inculpatory statements from the detainee himself, the possibility
should also have been considered by a tribunal weighing all statements and information relating to the detainee which may have been,
in the words of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, “obtained as a
163
result of coercion.”
This statute was not enacted until December
162
Dep’t of Def., supra note 27. Mohammad Atiq Al Harbi, ISN 333, stated that
there were documents available to the United States that would prove that his classification as an enemy combatant was wrong. Id. Mr. Al Harbi also objected to anonymous secret evidence:
It is important you find the notes on my visa and passport because they
show I was there for 8 days and could not have been expected to go to
Afghanistan and engage in hostilities against anyone. . . . I understand
you cannot tell me who said this, but I ask that you look at this individual very closely because his story is false. If you ask this person the
right question, you will see that very quickly. I am trusting you to do
this for me.
Id.
163
10 U.S.C. § 801 (2006). The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 provides in part:
b) Consideration of statements derived with coercion.
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2005, after the CSRT process was complete, but indications of torture
or coercion suffered by a detainee should have at least raised hearsay
164
concerns, which the tribunal is required to consider.
The record
does not indicate such an inquiry by any tribunal. Instead, the tribunal usually made note of allegations of torture and referred them
165
to the convening authority. This fact is less surprising than the fact
that several tribunals found a detainee to be an enemy combatant before receiving any results from such investigation. While there is no
way of ascertaining the extent, if any, to which coercion might have
affected witness statements’, 18% of the detainees alleged torture; in
each case, the detainee volunteered the information rather than responding after been asked by the tribunal or the personal representative. Also, in each case, the panel proceeded to decide the case before any investigation was undertaken.
IX. ACTIONS OF THE CSRT WHEN A DETAINEE PREVAILED
Nevertheless, the detainees sometimes won—at least initially.
The Department of Defense order of July 14, 2006, states that:
The Director, CSRT, shall review the Tribunal’s decision and may
approve the decision and take appropriate action, or return the
record to the Tribunal for further proceedings. In cases where
the Tribunal decision is approved and the case is considered final,
the Director, CSRT, shall so advise the DoD Office of Detainee Affairs, the Secretary of State, and any other relevant U.S. Govern166
ment agencies.

If the director of the CSRT decides, he may send any decision back to
167
the CSRT for further proceedings, which means that the detainee
can be subjected to multiple hearings until the government is satis(1) Assessment. The procedures submitted to Congress pursuant to
subsection (a)(1)(A) shall ensure that a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or Administrative Review Board, or any similar or successor administrative tribunal or board, in making a determination of status or
disposition of any detainee under such procedures, shall, to the extent
practicable, assess—
(A) whether any statement derived from or relating to such detainee
was obtained as a result of coercion; and
(B) the probative value (if any) of any such statement.
Id.
164

Memorandum Procedures CSRT, supra note 9, at Enclosure 1, (G)7.
See, e.g., Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision at 3, Nechle v.
Bush,
No.
04-CV-1166
(D.D.C.
Oct.
28,
2004),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_4947-5068.pdf.
166
Memorandum Procedures CSRT, supra note 9, at Enclosure 1, (I)8.
167
Id.
165
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fied with the ruling. The additional hearings were always conducted
outside the detainee’s presence, and the detainee was never notified
168
of his “victory” in the first proceeding.
At least three detainees were initially found to not be enemy
combatants and then subjected to multiple re-hearings until they
169
were ultimately found to be enemy combatants.
Several detainees
had second hearings, and at least one detainee, after the first and
second hearings unanimously found him not to be an enemy combatant, had yet a third hearing—again in absentia—which finally found
170
him to be an enemy combatant. The government’s record for one
detainee whose proceeding was returned for a second hearing stated:
“On 24 November 2004, a previous Tribunal unanimously determined that the detainee was not properly designated as an enemy
171
combatant.”
The record continued: “On 25 January 2005, this Tribunal, upon
review of all the evidence, determined that detainee #654 was proper172
ly [unanimously] designated as an enemy combatant.”
A more egregious record of a detainee twice subjected to tribunals is that of detainee ISN 250. The following excerpts present a vivid
example of just how little was needed to determine that a detainee
was not an enemy combatant. Detainee ISN 250 elected not to appear in person before the tribunal, but the tribunal considered his
statement and unanimously found that he was improperly designated
173
as an enemy combatant. That decision, however, did not stand for
long. The government’s own legal sufficiency review as written by
Commander James R. Crisfield, Jr., U.S. Navy, synopsized the
processing of detainee ISN 250’s case:
A letter from the personal representative initially assigned to
represent the detainee at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, reflects the detainee’s elections and is attached to the Tribunal Decision Report

168

See supra note 29–32 and accompanying text.
See supra note 29–32 and accompanying text.
170
See supra note 29–32 and accompanying text.
171
Memorandum from Peter C. Bradford, Assistant Legal Advisor, to Director,
Combatant Status Review Tribunal at 1, Alghazawy v. Bush, No. 05-2378 (D.D.C. Sept.
20,
2006),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_3190-3290.pdf..
172
Id.
173
Memorandum from James R. Crisfield Jr., Legal Advisor, to Dir. at 2, Combatant Status Review Tribunal, Al Oshan, No. 05-0520 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 2005), available at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_1731-1808.pdf.
169
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as exhibit D-b. The original Tribunal proceedings were held in
absentia outside Guantánamo Bay with a new personal representative who was familiar with the detainee’s file. This personal representative had the same access to information and evidence as the
personal representative from Guantánamo Bay. The addendum
proceedings were conducted with yet a third personal representative because the second Personal Representative had been transferred to Guantánamo Bay. This Personal Representative also
had full access to the detainee’s file and original Personal Representative’s pass-down information. The detainee’s Personal Representatives were given the opportunity to review the respective
records of proceedings and both declined to submit post-tribunal
174
comments to the Tribunal.

Despite the initial finding that the detainee was not an enemy combatant and the obvious difficulties reflected in this tortured process,
Commander Crisfield concluded that “[t]he proceedings and decision of the Tribunal, as reflected in enclosure (3), are legally suffi175
cient and no corrective action is required.”
Commander Crisfield
recommended approval of the decision of the subsequent hearing
176
that found detainee ISN 250 to be an enemy combatant.
The record of the third decision for yet another detainee, ISN
556, whose proceeding was returned twice, stated the following in a
memorandum prepared after his third tribunal: “On 15 December
2004, the original Tribunal unanimously determined that the detai177
nee should no longer be designated as an enemy combatant.” Following the initial hearing, the tribunal’s membership was changed.
The record continued:
Due to the removal of one of the three members of the original
tribunal panel, the additional evidence, along with the original
evidence and original Tribunal Decision Report, was presented to
tribunal panel #30 to reconsider the detainee’s status. On 21
January 2005 that tribunal also unanimously determined that the
178
detainee should no longer be classified as an enemy combatant.

The tribunal’s membership was subsequently changed yet again:

174

Id. at 3.
Id.
176
Id.
177
Memorandum from James R. Crisfield Jr., Legal Advisor, to Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunal at 2839, Abdulla v. Bush, No. 05-1001 (D.D.C. Aug. 16,
2006),
available
at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/csrt_arb/publicly_fil
ed_CSRT_records_2737-2868.pdf.
178
Id.
175
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Once again, additional information regarding the detainee was
sought, found, and presented to yet a third tribunal. This additional additional [sic] information became exhibits R-23 through
R-30. This time, the three members of the second tribunal were
no longer available, but the one original tribunal member who
was not available for the second tribunal was now available for the
third. That member, along with two new members, comprised
tribunal panel #34 and sat for the detainee’s third tribunal. Following their consideration of the new additional information
along with the information considered by the first two tribunals,
this Tribunal determined that the detainee was properly classified
179
as an enemy combatant.

The records of other detainees suggest additional instances of
rehearings. In these proceedings, the tribunal reconvened and considered an issue about the quality of the evidence, but there is no
record of what transpired at the first hearing, why the second hearing
occurred, or the effect of the issues of concern about the quality of
the evidence.
X. BOTTOM LINE
The Secretary of the Navy described the CSRT as “a one-time review to determine if a person, a detainee, is or is not an enemy com180
batant.” Five hundred fifty-eight detainees had hearings before the
CSRT from 2002 to 2006. As a result of the CSRT process, thirtyeight detainees, or 7% of the total, were released from Guantánamo
having been found not to be enemy combatants. In contrast to these
numbers, no detainee in the sample set reviewed in this Report was
ultimately found either to not be, or to no longer be, an enemy combatant as a result of the CSRT—even though some were initially
found to be either “non-enemy” combatants or “no longer” enemy
combatants by a first (or even a second) tribunal.
The difference between a “non-enemy” combatant and one who
is “no longer” an enemy combatant is not clear. The label “nonenemy combatant,” however, implies that the government mistakenly
detained the prisoners in the first instance, while “no longer enemy
combatant” implies that the prisoner was once an enemy combatant,
but his detainment at Guantánamo Bay successfully rehabilitated
him. Despite these connotations, the government appears to consider the labels interchangeable.
179

Id.
Gordon England, U.S. Sec’y of the Navy, Defense Department Special Briefing
on Combatant Status Review Tribunals’ (Mar. 29, 20050, available at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2504.
180
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For example, Secretary of the Navy Gordon England used both
terms when he described the CSRT process on March 29, 2005.
The Tribunals also concluded that 38 detainees were found to no
longer meet the criteria to be designated as enemy combatants. . .
. 520 enemy combatants, 38 non-enemy combatants. . . . It should
be emphasized that a CSRT determination that a detainee no
longer meets the criteria for classification as an enemy combatant
does not necessarily mean that the prior classification as [an
181
enemy combatant] was wrong.

XI. CONCLUSION
This Report lays out the CSRT process, both as it exists on paper
and as it was implemented at Guantánamo. While the procedures
promised detainees an opportunity to present evidence in the form
of witnesses and documents, in reality the only evidence permitted in
the vast majority of cases was the testimony of the detainee. In most
cases the tribunals returned decisions on the same day and among
the 102 records reviewed for this Report, the ultimate decision was
always unanimous, and almost all detainees reviewed were ultimately
found to be enemy combatants. In its attempt to replace habeas corpus, the government instead created this no-hearing process.

181

Id.

